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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
RONALD STREFF, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12965 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The defendant was charged by information together 
with Jackie Dale Howard and David Jones of the crime 
of robbery in that "said defendants robbed Evelyn Baker" 
(R. P. 22). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The defendants Howard and Jones having therefore 
entered pleas of guilty to burglary in the second degree 
(R. P. 110), the defendant Streff was tried before a jury 
in the Second Judicial District Court in and for Weber 
County, State of Utah, before the Honorable Calvin 
Gould, presiding. He was found guilty and sentenced t.o 
serve in the Utah State Prison not less than five years, 
which may be for life (R. P. 95). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the conviction affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 16, 1971, David Jones and Jackie 
Howard entered the Canyon View Grocery in Ogden and 
committed armed robbery on the person of Evelyn Baker 
at approximately 6: 30 p.m. (T. 112). Just prior to the 
robbery, Mrs. Baker sent two girls, Connie and Kathy 
Van Leeuwen, to a next door neighbor's house to deliver 
a newspaper (T. 113). After the robbery, Mrs. Baker 
observed the robbers running to a Volkswagen in the park-
ing lot and made a note of the license number. She then 
reported this number, EC 7004, to the police (T. 115). 
Connie and Kathy Van Leeuwen testified that upon 
leaving· the store, they had observed a man sitting alone 
in a light-colored Volkswagen (R. 120 & 123), which was 
the only car in the lot (T. 123). Upon returning to the 
store to give Mrs. Baker the money, the girls observed 
that the Volkswagen was still there and the man was still 
sitting in it (T. 121 and 123). The girls then left before 
the robbery occurred. 
Officer Bailey testified that he responded to a call 
concerning the robbery at about 6: 30 p.m. and proceeded 
to set up a road block on the corner of Harrison and 28th 
3 
Street (T. 128). The appellant's car stopped four cars 
from the road block at which time all three persons 
emerged and began to flee. Officer Bailey identified the 
appellant as the driver (R. 129, 130, 131). 
Officer Turner of the Ogden Police Department also 
responded to a dispatch involving the Canyon View Mar-
ket robbery and was proceeding north on Harrison Boule-
vard when he observed the suspect's car in the south-
bound lane. He also identified the appellant as the driver 
(T. 140, 141, 145). 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT CORRECTLY DENIED 
THE MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT 
BECAUSE THE STATE PRESENTED SUF-
FICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT APPEL-
LANT OF AIDING AND ABETTING THE 
CRIME OF ROBBERY. 
The law concerning a defendant's motion to direct 
a verdict of not guilty was succinctly stated in State v. 
Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 286, 272 P. 2d 195 (1954): 
"It has been repeatedly held by this court that 
upon a motion to dismiss or to direct a verdict of 
not guilty for lack of evidence that the trial court 
does not consider the weight of the evidence or 
credibility of the witnesses, but determines the 
naked legal proposition of law, whether there is 
any substantial evidence of the guilt of the ac-
cused, and all reasonable inferences are to be taken 
in favor of the state .... 
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. " [I] f there is before the court evidence upon 
which reasonable men might cliff er as to whether 
the defendant is or is not guilty he may deny the 
motion." 272 at 198. 
This holding has been followed in State v. Rivenburgh, 
11 Utah 2d 95, 355 P. 2d 183 (1960) and State v. Woodall, 
6 Utah 2d 8, 305 P. 2d 473 (1956). 
On appeal, appellant makes two assertions: 1. There 
was no evidence that appellant aided or abetted the com-
mission of the crime. 2. There was no other evidence 
which would in any way connect appellant with the crime. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-44 (1953) reads: 
"All persons concerned in the commission of 
a crime, either felony or misdemeanor, whether 
they directly commit the act constituting the 
offense or aid and abet in its commission or not 
being present, have advised and encouraged its 
commission, . . . are principals in any crime so 
committed." 
The appellant was not an unknowing bystander or un· 
witting participant. He was by prior arrangement, the 
driver of the getaway car, an involvement which made 
him just as guilty as Howard and Jones, who actually 
committed the robbery on the person of Mrs. Baker. 
The following evidence presented at trial was such 
that reasonable men could determine that appellant was 
guilty of robbery: 1. Mrs. Baker jotted down the license 
number of the getaway vehicle (EC 7004) immediately 
after the robbery, which occurred around 6: 30 p.m., De· 
cember 16, 1971 (T. 115, 117 and 119). 2. Two witnesses, 
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who left the store, returned, anl left again prior to the 
robbery while the robbers were in the store, testified that 
they observed a third man sitting alone in a light colored 
Volkswagen (T. 120, 123), later identified as the getaway 
vehicle. 3. Approximately fifteen minutes after the rob-
bery, the Volkswagen with license number EC 7004 (T. 
135) was observed by police and stopped at a road block. 
Appellant was the driver. This was established by the 
testimony of several officers (T. 128, 129, 131, 132, 140). 
4. All three suspects started to run from the vehicle and 
appellant Streff attempted to elude capture by running 
down a driveway (T. 129). 
These facts provide sufficient basis for the jury's 
verdict. In cases similar to the one at bar, this court has 
held: 
less: 
"The prerogative of judging the credibility of 
... testimony was for the jury, and under the tra-
ditional rule, the evidence is to be reviewed in the 
light favorable to their verdict. This involves rec-
ognition of the privilege which was theirs, not only 
of believing those aspects of the evidence which 
support the verdict, but also of drawing all reason-
able inferences that could fairly be deducted there-
from ... " (Footnote omitted.) State v. Murphy, 
26 Utah 2d 330, 489 P. 2d 430 at 432 (1971). 
There is no basis for setting aside a jury verdict un-
"[T]he evidence was so inconclusive or unsat-
isfactory that reasonable minds acting fairly upon 
it must have entertained reasonable doubt that 
defendants committed the crime. Unless the evi-
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dence compels such conclusion as a matter of law 
the verdict must stand .... " (Emphasis added.) 
State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P. 2d 212 
(1957). 
Appellant's counsel called as a witness one of the 
robbers, David Jones. Mr. Jones offered testimony t.o 
the effect that appellant had been let out of the car prior 
to the robbery and picked up after it was completed. 
Thus, appellant argues, he had no knowledge of the rob-
bery. The jury obviously did not believe this self-serving 
testimony. It is the prerogative of the jury to determine, 
from the facts and circumstances shown in evidence, 
whether a witness is telling the truth. The facts and cir-
cumstances, as viewed by the jury: 
" ... may well [be] regarded as speaking louder 
thna defendant's later defensive claims as to what 
his intentions were." State v. Peterson, 22 Utah 
2d 377, 453 P. 2d 697 (1969). 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the jury could reasonably 
infer from the evidence established at the trial, that the 
defendant was guilty of aiding and abetting Messrs. How-
ard and Jones in the crime of robbery. The court was 
therefore correct in submitting instructions on aiding and 
abetting to the jury. The verdict should therefore be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
DAVID R. IRVINE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
